Legal News: Landlord and Tenant (Collateral estoppel)

A Housing Court judge dismissed on issue preclusion grounds a plaintiff property manager's summary process action against one of its tenants, the dismissal order must be reversed, as the issue in the summary process action is not identical to an issue already litigated in District Court.

"The plaintiff, property manager Forest City Residential Management, Inc., brought this summary process action against one of its tenants, Douglas Burns, seeking to evict him for 'failure to vacate pursuant to a lawful notice terminating tenancy and following expiration of the least term.'  More specifically, the notice of termination informed Burns that he had 'repeatedly engaged in ...inappropriate, derogatory and racist comments and conduct towards minority staff members...conduct that has interfered with management's ability to perform its duties and constitutes a business reason for...terminating your tenancy.' A Housing Court judge dismissed the case, concluding that 'all issues raised on the present action have been litigated in a prior matter.'

"That prior matter was a jury trial in the District Court in which the plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to terminate the lease agreement with Burns before the expiration of its term based on allegations of his racist misconduct toward the plaintiff's employees. Because we conclude that the issue in this summary process action in the Housing Court is not identifcal to the issue already litigated in the District Court, the Housing Court action is not collaterally estopped by the prior verdict. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the case....

"Burns argues, with some force, that issue preclusion was properly applied because the allegations of his racially motivated misconduct were at the core of each case. While we agree that there may be significant factual ovelap in the two actions, we are not persuaded that the issues are identical for purposes of issue preclusion. In the first action the plaintiff's specific allegation was that Burns's misconduct violated paragraph nineteen of the lease agreement, which provided that occupants were not permitted to 'commit any acts of misconduct, violations of law, or otherwise engage in any activity that disturbs the peace and quiet of other Residents of the Landlord's management staff.' Paragraph nineteen further provided that such misconduct violated the lease agreement and entitled the plaintiff to terminate the lease agreement before the lease term ended.

"However, in the subsequent Housing Court action, the plaintiff sought to enforce paragraph eight of the HUD addendum to the lease agreement...which described the circumstances in which the plaintiff could terminate the tenancy after the initial lease term ended. The HUD addendum provided that the plantiff was entitled to terminate the tenancy after the intitial lease term for 'other good cuase'  including a 'business or economic reason.' In the notice of nonenewal, the plaintiff notified Burns that, based on his misconduct, 'several staff members have been made to feel uncomfortable, unsafe, and/or unable to perform their job functions...constituting a business reason for non-renewing...your tenancy at the end of the curernt (lease) term.'  Thus, the issue to be decided in the Housing Court action had to do with the impact of Burns's behavior on the plaintiff's employees and business, rather than with the behavior itself. That issue, although related, is not identifical to the issue tried in the Distict Court".

"Moreover, we  are not persuaded by Burns's argument that the DIistrict Court jury 'must have disbelieved the landlord's witnesses and believed Burns when he said that the incidents described by the landlord's witnesses did not occur.' The jury were never asked whether the plaintiff had proved that Burns engaged in the alleged racially motivated misconduct. The only question put to the jury was: 'Did Burns engage in material violations of the Lease Agreement and thus entitle the Plaintiff to termination of the tenancy?' Despite the parties' requests that the jury be instructed that the material violation alleged was the racially motivated assaults of the plaintiff's employees, the judge did not give that instruction, Instead the jury were instructed that the material violation was that Burns 'remained on the premises after the landlord properly terminated the relationship.' Thus, the District Court jury could have concluded that the racially motivated assaults occurred, but that they were not material violations of the lease agreement. Because we cannot discern from this record exactly what the jury decided regarding the issue of the alleged racially motivated assaults, we cannot conclude that the issue was necessarily decided and essential to the earlier judgement...

"For these reasons we conclude that the doctrine of issue preclusion does not foreclose the plaintiff's Housing Court action. "The order of dismissal is vacated."